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Abstract 
Faced with an aging population and a low fertility rate, Japan finds it increasingly essential to shift 
diminishing national savings into productive investment in order to preserve the dynamism of its 
economy. Stock investment by institutional investors is important for corporate financing, and 
shareholder involvement in governance influences corporate growth. Using panel data for Japan’s 
listed companies and foreign investors’ votes on shareholder proposals, this paper demonstrates: (1) 
an increase in stock ownership by foreign investors’ had a positive effect on productivity growth, but 
it has not recently improved other corporate performance indices, and (2) foreign investors’ strong 
attitudes towards voting had a positive effect on productivity growth. This paper concludes that 
external stakeholders’ active, qualitative involvement in corporate governance and their quantitative 
involvement by increasing stock ownership are key to improving corporate growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Given the problems of an aging population and a low fertility rate, Japan finds 
it increasingly essential to shift diminishing national savings into investment to promote 
dynamism in the macro-economy and to sustain growth. Stock investment by 
institutional investors is a key factor in corporate finance and economic growth. 
Therefore, is important to investigate how large shareholders involve themselves in 
corporate governance and whether their involvement promotes corporate profitability, 
values, and productivity growth. 
The relationship between stock ownership and corporate performance in 
Japan has been discussed, as it concerns the unique situation of ownership by main 
banks, cross-shareholdings, group companies, and close keiretsu clients. Morck, 
Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000), Horiuchi and Hanasaki (2004), and other studies 
examine Japan’s banking system and its relationship with corporate performance. 
However, since the mid-1990s, the ownership structure of Japanese 
companies has changed following the introduction of new types of investment funds in 
Japan. Large funds, such as investment trusts and pension funds, have recently 
established a greater presence in corporate governance by exercising voting rights as 
shareholders. 
Since the 1990s, the issue of corporate governance has attracted attention 
from investors and corporate management. As Japan’s stock market continued to decline 
after the bubble era, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, large institutional foreign 
investors, such as the California Public Employee Retirement System (CalPERS) that 
had established guidelines for exercising its voting rights in the 1980s, claimed to 
improve disclosure and governance of Japanese firms. Following CalPERS’ lead, 
Japan’s public pension funds began to establish their own guidelines for exercising 
voting rights. 
This paper analyzes the relationship between stock ownership and corporate 
performance and extends previous studies in several areas. First, using the latest panel 
data of listed companies in FY2007, this study introduces multiple corporate 
performance indicators of ordinary profit ratios, Tobin’s q, and total factor productivity  
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(TFP). This enables us to compare the effects of stock ownership by investor category 
on various corporate performance measures. Second, we use a detailed data set of 
shareholder votes cast by U.S. institutional investors to demonstrate the relationship 
between investors’ attitudes towards exercising votes and corporate performance. By 
this approach, we capture both quantitative and qualitative effects of stock ownership on 
corporate governance. 
The rest of this paper contains the following sections: Section 2 explains the 
characteristic roles of various internal and external stakeholders and their relation to 
corporate governance. Section 3 reviews previous empirical studies about the 
relationship between stock ownership and corporate governance in Japan. Section 4 
covers this study’s concepts, empirical framework, and contributions. Section 5 explains 
the specification of models employed in this study. Section 6 explains the data sets used 
in this study and how to construct them. Sections 7 and 8 present descriptive statistics of 
the data and the results of estimations from the models. Section 9 summarizes the 
results of this study and suggests policy implications. 
 
2. Corporate governance and stakeholders 
 
There are multiple ways in which stakeholders oversee the management of 
companies. Miyajima, et al., (2002) and other related literature, discusses methods 
available to internal and external stakeholders and further divides external stakeholders 
into creditors and shareholders. 
 
2-1. Internal stakeholders 
 
Internal stakeholders long have had an important role in corporate governance, 
especially in Japan. In effect, most Japanese companies have a long-term employment 
agreement with employees. Their particular skills belong to business of their own 
companies, and employees recognize their company’s investment in them as a sunk cost. 
Thus, when their company’s business deteriorates, employees have an incentive to  
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monitor management in order to improve business performance rather than quit to 
change jobs (Miyajima, et al., (2002)). 
 
2-2. Creditors and debt holders 
 
Creditors are typical stakeholders in Japanese companies that have had a 
strong relationship with main banks for a long time. As Jensen (1986) explains, 
creditors, in general, may take control of company when it faces bankruptcy, and have a 
right to force it into liquidation or be restructured under debt contracts. Creditors have 
an incentive to monitor whether management operates its business profitably, and 
management is aware of its creditors’ watchfulness. For example, monitoring by 
creditors prompts management to maintain profits sufficient for debt repayment, to 
streamline assets and number of employees, and to adjust cash flows properly for 
repayment (Hirota (1996)). 
The role of main banks has also been emphasized in Japan. Main banks have 
various relationships with debtors, such as providing loans, holding shares, and sharing 
managers. Until the 1980s, monitoring effects of main banks were highly evaluated. But 
since the 1990s, Japanese banks faced large problems with bad loans, and 
cross-shareholding was dissolved, numerous studies demonstrated that monitoring by 
main banks was not effective and actually created a moral hazard of debtors’ 
management and made it inefficient (Hirota (1996), Miyajima, et al., (2001), Weinstein 
and Yafeh (1998), Horiuchi and Hanasaki (2004)). 
 
2-3. Shareholders and stock ownership structure 
 
As Okabe (2007) explains, shareholders exercise two types of influence over 
management. First, shareholders have a role in controlling internal management at 
shareholder meetings. By exercising their vote at shareholder meetings, shareholders are 
able to monitor and influence management by criticizing their performance, electing 
board members, and approving or disapproving measures brought to a shareholder vote.  
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Second, a publicly traded company is monitored by capital markets. When the business 
performance of a company is deteriorating, shareholders express their disapproval to 
management by selling their shares. On the other hand, management has a possibility to 
be controlled by another company through a hostile takeover. 
This paper focuses on the former type of involvement by shareholders and 
investigates how changes in the composition of stockholders and their willingness to 
exercise their voting rights influence corporate profits, values, and productivity growth. 
Accordingly, the next section explains characteristics of major groups of shareholders. 
 
Stable shareholders 
Nishizaki and Kurasawa (2002) suggest that the effectiveness of shareholder 
monitoring on corporate governance depends on stock ownership structure. In Japan, 
long-term stockholders—for example, cross-shareholders and employee funds—have 
had an important role in corporate governance. One of their main roles is to protect the 
corporation from being taken over by another firm, and they have an implicit contract 
not to oppose management’s proposals and not to sell their shares. As Japanese capital 
markets de-regulated and trading volume of stocks increased in Japan, empirical studies 
of corporate governance have emphasized the possibility of moral hazard caused by this 
group of shareholders. 
 
Foreign shareholders 
Since the 1990s, cross-shareholding for maintaining stable shares has been 
dissolved and ownership by institutional and individual investors has increased. 
Especially, ownership by foreign institutional investors continued to rise, and they have 
taken a lead in exercising their rights as investors to monitor corporate management. In 
the 1980s, CalPERS, one of the largest U.S. pension funds, established guidelines for 
voting at shareholder meetings and has had a large influence on domestic institutional 
investors. However, some foreign investors actively trade stocks for short-term gains. 
Short-term investors pressure companies mainly by selling stock, and the monitoring 
effect of their ownership tends to be shorter than that of long-term investors. Therefore,  
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as Kimura and Kiyota (2003) point out, it is not necessarily accurate to suggest that 




On the other hand, individual investors have increased their share ownership 
recently. Because each investor owns a small part of shares and since their interests of 
investors are not concentrated, they do not have a strong incentive to monitor 
management of companies they invest in. 
 
Financial institutions 
The role of main banks as shareholders in corporate governance is similar to 
that of creditors. They have the right to vote at shareholder meetings and to monitor as 
debtors in non-public relationship as main banks. By installing board members in their 
client companies, main banks are able to influence and change management personnel. 
Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1997) verify such effects. 
However, as Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) suggest, the “hold-up” problem occurs 
when main banks use information of their clients to increase cost of borrowers that are 
not able to strongly negotiate with banks. 
Thus, whether the ownership effect of main banks and other financial 
institutions is positive for corporate governance and business performance, this has yet 
to be determined by empirical studies. As described later, the previous literature shows 
conflicting results. 
 
2-4. Voting rights exercised by investors 
 
Votes by domestic investors 
Exercising voting rights at shareholder meetings are typical measures for 
shareholders to monitor and influence the management of companies they invest in. In 
the mid-1990s, investment returns of institutional investors declined and, especially in  
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regard to pension funds, fiduciary responsibility began to be emphasized. Since public 
pension funds, unlike private investors, typically have not had close a business 
relationship with private companies, it has been easier for them to exercise voting rights 
without hesitation. 
Since early in this decade, the Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF), 
the largest public pension fund in Japan with 2 trillion yen invested in stocks, has 
declared the importance of exercising voting rights to improve corporate performance as 
well as to achieve its long-term, diversified investment strategies. Since FY2003, the 
GPIF has evaluated the external fund managers’ exercise of voting rights, and at present 
it exercises all voting rights to which it is entitled. The Pension Fund Association for 
Local Government Offices, which invests in 0.2 trillion yen in stocks, established its 
investment policy in 2001, including its principles of corporate governance and its 
guidelines for exercising voting rights. The Federation of National Public Service 
Personnel Mutual Aid Associations, which invests in 50 million yen in stocks, also at 
that time, established its guidelines for exercising voting rights. 
It is difficult for private funds to exercise voting rights freely because of their 
interests and relationships with other private companies. However, the Pension Fund 
Association, a federation of employees’ pension funds created by the Employees’ 
Pension Insurance Act, must act as a quasi-public investor because it provides pension 
benefits to those who seceded from employees’ pension funds. It aggregates different 
corporate pension plans, including employees’ pension funds, defined benefit corporate 
plans, and defined contribution plans. It established guidelines for exercising voting 
rights in 2001 and released its own criteria for exercising votes as it started in-house 
investment in 2003. 
Investment trusts also began to emphasize voting rights as their invested 
assets increased in the 2000s. In 2003, the Investment Trusts Association of Japan 
released guidelines for fund managers to consider in exercising voting rights and 
specified that each fund should establish and publish its own criteria. 
 
Votes by foreign investors  
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In the U.S., many public pension funds, other than CalPERS and TIAA-CREF, 
are relatively small and outsource their investments to external fund managers. The 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974 mentioned fiduciary responsibility of 
investors, but it was the 1980s that the importance of exercising voting rights was 
emphasized, and a U.S. Department of Labor reply to the AVON letter ruled that voting 
was mandatory. Also, in 1994, the department’s Sherman Letter declared that proper 
fiduciary responsibility specifically includes exercising voting rights. 
As for investment trusts, after the Enron debacle, the SEC mandated that 
funds are obligated to establish policies for voting and to disclose their votes in detail. 
Although they cannot obligate foreign firms to vote on shareholder matters, most do 
vote because information systems and procedures are in place, making it easier for 
funds to exercise voting rights in the U.S. than other countries. In the U.K., where such 
infrastructure has not been well arranged, foreign firms seem less inclined to exercise 
their voting rights (Koda, Saito, and Matsuda (2007)). 
 
3. Previous literature on corporate governance and stock ownership 
 
As the importance of corporate governance has become more widely 
recognized in Japan, the number of empirical studies concerning effects of stock 
ownership structure on Japanese corporate governance has grown since the mid-1990s. 
Using data of Japanese manufacturing companies in 1979–1989, Lichtenberg 
and Pushner (1994) analyze the relationship between stock ownership structure and 
corporate performance as measured by productivity growth and ROA. The result shows 
that the effect of financial institutions’ ownership on performance is significantly 
positive, while the effect of cross-shareholding is negative. 
Sasaki and Yonezawa (2000) use financial data of 278 Japanese companies 
from FY1992 to FY1998 to demonstrate that an increase in foreign investors’ share 
ownership has a positive effect on Tobin’s q. However, Japanese-type corporate 
governance represented by the system of main banks has a negative effect on corporate 
values, because labor share tends to be higher under the Japanese governance system  
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that understates shareholder values. 
Nishizaki and Kurasawa (2002) conducted a study similar to Sasaki and 
Yonezaki (2000). They also suggest that concentration of ownership by major 
shareholders has a positive effect on Tobin’s q, while the influence of 
cross-shareholding on corporate value is negative in the 1990s. 
Miyajima, et al., (2002), used financial data of Japan’s approximately 1,000 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms in 1990–1999 to demonstrate the positive 
effect of foreign investors’ ownership on increasing Total Factor Productivity (TFP). 
However, ownership by long-term shareholders, particularly financial institutions and 
cross-shareholders, and by individual investors does not significantly improve TFP.   
Using the unbalanced panel data of about 2,500 Japanese manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing companies for 1970–2000, Horiuchi and Hanasaki (2004) extended 
the above studies by introducing variables indicating the degree of competition in 
product markets. In regard to stock ownership structure, their results show that the 
significance on productivity growth of concentrated stock ownership, financial 
institutions’ ownership, and foreign investors’ ownership depends on the sample period 
and industry. A consistent relationship between ownership structure and productivity 
growth is not demonstrated. 
In sum, previous studies other than Horiuchi and Hanasaki (2004) indicate 
that increasing stock ownership by financial institutions and foreign investors has a 
positive effect on corporate value and productivity, but cross-shareholding does not. 
However, the sample periods of these studies are mainly in the 1990s. Increasing share 
of foreign investors in stock ownership of listed companies were halted in the late 1990s 
to the beginning of the 2000s but increased again from the mid-2000s. Thus, it is 
necessary to prove whether the positive relationship would hold. 
Also, the number of sample firms in the studies is limited because the authors 
use balanced panel data. Horiuchi and Hanasaki (2004), which cover more firms by 
using unbalanced panel data, draw more detailed conclusions. 
Moreover, the previous studies consider the shares of major stockholders, but 
determining how strong or active investors’ attitudes towards monitoring are is more  
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important for clarifying the effects of ownership on corporate governance. 
 
4. Empirical framework 
 
The basic purpose of this study is to demonstrate the effects of stock 
ownership structure on business performance measures such as profitability, 
productivity, and corporate values of Japanese listed companies. The study especially 
focuses on foreign investors’ monitoring of management. One reasons for this focus is 
that, while foreign investors have increased their ownership of stock in Japanese 
companies for a long time, it is important to demonstrate the significant of their 
monitoring effect on corporate governance, and whether the significance has recently 
changed. 
Another reason is that foreign investors are considered to be active in 
monitoring management active than are domestic investors; therefore, it is important to 
measure the strength of their attitude about monitoring management. Analysis of U.S. 
investors can be conducted because their activities at shareholder meetings, particularly 
their votes on shareholder proposals, are reported to the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Although Japanese institutional investors’ activities at shareholder 
meetings are not publicly available, this study helps draw implications from the 
analyses of foreign investors’ behavior. 
Compared with previous studies noted above, this study has two 
characteristics: First, this study demonstrates the effects of stock ownership structure on 
multiple indices of business performance. We calculate ordinary profit ratio, total factor 
productivity, and Tobin’s q for Japanese listed companies from FY1986 to FY2007. 
This enables us to compare the effects on those indices and also cover the latest sample 
periods. 
Second, in order to evaluate external stakeholders’ commitment to corporate 
management, this study considers not only quantitative ownership structure, that is, 
each share of stockholders that was introduced in most previous studies, but also 
qualitative ownership structure that represent investors’ attitudes towards monitoring.  
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We use Proxy Watch released by IR Japan, Inc., a database of votes at shareholder 
meetings exercised by U.S. investors in Japanese companies, to obtain how many 
affirmative or dissenting votes were exercised and what kinds of proposals were voted 
on. Tracking this voting data helps to capture the strength of foreign investors’ attitudes 
about monitoring management and to demonstrate qualitative effects on corporate 
governance. 
 
5. Model specification 
Our basic empirical model for estimation in this study is as follows: 
 




PI denotes three indices of business performance—ordinary profit ratio, total factor 
productivity, and Tobin’s q (average q and marginal q)—of each sample firm, set as 
dependent variables. As independent variables, D denotes the debt ratio, calculated as 
interest-bearing debt divided by total capital, a control variable that is used in most 
previous literature. GOV denotes a share of stocks owned by government-affiliated 
institutions.  FIN denotes ownership by financial institutions, CRP by non-financial 
institutions, FRN by foreign investors, and IDV by individuals. 
VT denotes a ratio of affirmative or dissenting votes to all voting rights (affirmative, 
dissentient, abstention, and unexercised). It qualitatively represents the strength of 
investors’ attitudes toward monitoring and commitment to corporate governance. TD 
represents a set of time (year) dummies, and ID represents a set of industry dummies. 
Parameter i denotes each firm of our sample, and t denotes each sample year. 
It is widely known that the problem of causality of corporate performance and 
stockownership might arise. This specification tried to avoid such causality problem of 





6. Data set and construction 
 
6-1. Sample firms 
 
Our sample consists of Japanese listed companies in FY1986–2007, financial 
statement data of which are obtained from the Corporate Financial Databank of the 
Development Bank of Japan (DBJ). This database covers all Japanese listed firms, 
excluding financial institutions, from FY1956, but our study focuses on the period from 
FY1986 to FY2007 and excludes agriculture, forestry and fisheries, utilities, and 
financials because of data limitations. As Table 1 shows, the number of sample firms in 
our unbalanced panel data set is around 2,000–3,000, enough to cover most listed firms. 
 
6-2. Business performance indices 
 
Ordinary profit ratio 
As mentioned above, three different indices are introduced in this study. In 
Japan, ordinary profit, defined as operating profit plus non-operating profit, is a primary 
indicator of nominal, accounting performance of manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
firms. Since both internal management and external stakeholders emphasize the 




Investors find it necessary to evaluate business performance of companies not 
only by nominal, accounting values but also by real, present values. This is because 
investors evaluate their investment performance by considering the present-value 
                                            
1  Although it could not be enough to completely handle the problem, we checked the reverse relationship 
between PIt-1 and the dependent variables of t periods, and confirmed it is not significant.  
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risk-and-return profile. Thus, as with the previous studies, this study estimates Tobin’s q 
of each sample firm. 
Empirically, Tobin’s q is defined as marginal q and average q. The proxy for 





  (2) 
MRC  ARC 
NI  DP  IP
K




(1) DPR  (4) 
 
MQ denotes marginal q, MRC marginal return on invested capital, CC capital 
cost,  IGP investment goods price, ARC average return on invested capital, NI net 
income after income tax, DP amount of depreciation, IP interest paid, IPBP interest 
paid including amortization of bond premium, IL interest-bearing liabilities, τ effective 
tax rate, and DPR accounting depreciation rate. This procedure is a similar to the 
estimation used in Suzuki (2001), and this marginal q assumes that a firm predicts the 
future marginal return on the currently invested capital under static expectations. 






 NS  IL IA MA
Krp
  (5) 
 
AQ denotes average q, HPS highest share price, LPS lowest share price, NS 
number of shares outstanding, IA inventory assets, MA miscellaneous assets, and Krp 
replacement value of fixed assets at the end of the previous period.   
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Total factor productivity (TFP) 
Productivity is another important indicator represents a firm’s efficiency of 
management and business growth. Total factor productivity, derived from a firm’s 
production function, accounts for effects in total output not caused by inputs. As TFP 
and its growth are considered to represent efficiency and technology growth, TFP is an 
index directly related to firm-level business growth and to the aggregate level of 
economic growth. 




1a  (6) 
 
Y denotes real output measured by real value added, K denotes capital input, 
and L denotes labor input. We obtain capital share, a, from estimating the following 
equation for each firm, and calculate TFP growth from the series of residuals of ln A: 
 
lnYi,t  lnAi,t  ailnKi,t  (1 ai)lnLi,t   (7) 
 
For calculating Tobin’s q and TFP from firm-level financial statement data in 
FY1986–2007, we construct present-valued assets and liabilities, real output, labor 
input, and capital input. Real output is defined as firms’ nominal value-added deflated 
by a wholesale price index defined at the industry level. As the DBJ database contains 
information on factor incomes from companies’ financial statements, a measure of 
nominal value-added at factor cost is constructed as the sum of expenditures on labor, 
rental expenses, depreciation expenses, operating profits before 
interest-taxes-and-public charges, and patent license fees. Using the method suggested 
by Hayashi and Inoue (1991), we estimate capital input by multiplying industry-level 
utilization rates and firm-level real capital stock constructed from the time-series data of 
fixed investment of nonresidential buildings, structures, machinery, transportation 
equipment, and instruments and tools. Labor input is calculated by multiplying the 




Stock ownership structure 
Share ratios of stocks owned by government-affiliated institutions, financial 
institutions, non-financial firms, foreign investors, and individuals are obtained from the 
DBJ database. 
 
Exercises of voting rights 
In order to qualitatively measure strength of investors’ commitments to 
corporate governance, this study utilizes the data set of Proxy Watch by IR Japan, Inc, 
which provides proxy solicitation and voting trend search services. The data set collects 
information about voting rights exercised by U.S. investors at shareholder meetings of 
Japanese companies held between July 2004 and June 2008. Based on reports submitted 
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission by the U.S investors, it covers more 
than 3,000 Japanese companies and approximately 900 mutual funds comprising about 
200 institutional investors. We can determine how shareholders voted, how many voted, 
the number of votes, and the types of proposals investors voted for or against. The data 
set contains numbers of affirmative, dissenting, abstaining, and unexercised votes. In 
order to gauge attitudes of investors to participate in monitoring through voting, we 
calculate the ratios of affirmative and dissenting votes divided by all voting rights, and 
define them as an indicator presenting strength of investors’ attitudes. In estimation of 
the model (1), significance of those ratios on business performance is compared with 
that of the ratios of other votes. 
 
7. Descriptive statistics 
 
Corporate performance indices 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of corporate performance indicators 
constructed by the above methods. In terms of median values, ordinary profit ratios in 
the sample period FY1986 to FY2007 are almost fully correlated with macro-economic  
16
trends. The ratios increased in the late 1980s, the bubble era, then sharply declined in 
the early 1990s. Until around FY2000 they continued to deteriorate, then steadily 
recovered to FY2006. 
Trends of Marginal q are similar to those of ordinary profit ratios. The main 
reason for the similarity is that expected future corporate values, which are necessary 
for estimating marginal q, are guided by the assumption of adaptive expectations in the 
method described in Section 6. Historical values of profits are based on the estimation 
of marginal q, and thus those two series show a similarity. 
On the other hand, time-series trends of median of average q are different 
from those of ordinary profit ratios and marginal q. The method introduced in Section 6 
uses actual stock prices as corporate values, including expected values in the future. It 
assumes that the pricing function of stock markets properly assesses the present values 
implied in stock prices. The surge in stock prices during the bubble era boosted average 
q, and the q ratios sharply declined in the early 1980s. After that, overall stock prices 
continued in a long slump until the early 2000s. 
If these trends in stock prices were biased by an inadequate pricing function of 
stock markets, average q is not an appropriate indicator of real corporate performance. 
However, if it is granted that one aim of corporate management is to improve the 
company’s market value and to increase stock prices, average q is not necessarily ruled 
out. Also, if it is a case that external investors especially emphasize profits from gains of 
stock prices by short-term trading rather than from gains of dividends by long-term 
buy-and-hold strategies, they aim to immediately promote stock prices and average q is 
one of the useful indicators. 
TFP growth rates showed an interesting trend in the sample period. The rates 
were higher in the 1980s, but, in the early and middle 1990s, remained in a narrow 
range between 0 to 2 percent, except for several years. Since FY2004, although nominal 
profits have increased, TFP growth has been negative. This means that the increase of 
real value-added has not surpassed increases in labor and capital inputs. In other words, 
business efficiency in real terms has weakened recently. 
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Stock ownership and other variables 
Table 2 shows the time-series trends in debt ratios and stock ownership 
structure—that is, shares owned by various categories of investors. First, the debt ratios 
decrease continuously from the middle 1980s. This trend follows a long-term decline of 
main banks’ share of debt and an increase in direct financing through capital markets. 
However, the ratios were flat during the economic boom in the mid-2000s. This implies 
that indirect finance from financial institutions still has an important role in supporting a 
company’s growth. 
Similarly, the number of stock shares owned by financial institutions has also 
decreased since the 1990s, following the dissolving of cross-shareholding, but the 
decline in the 2000s was limited compared with the sharp decline in the 1990s. It is not 
only because the Japanese Banking Law prohibits banks from owning more than 5% of 
another company’s outstanding shares, but also because there still exists an important 
reason for banks to hold stocks in order to maintain business channels with their clients 
and to monitor them. 
Non-financial institutions have decreased their holdings of stocks following 
the dissolving of cross-shareholding, but the decline has recently moderated in 
comparison to ownership by financial institutions. It is likely that some shares 
previously owned by banks have been transferred to non-financial firms. 
The number of shares owned by foreign investors steadily rose until the 1990s, 
although stock market averages continued to deteriorate during that period. The number 
of the shares declined in the financial crisis of the late 1990s, but it has surged since 
2000. Numerous factors potentially explain the uptrend, including the dissolving of 
cross-shareholding, the more attractive values of Japanese stocks relative to foreign 
stocks, and global excess liquidity flowing into Japanese markets. 
Ownership of Japanese stocks by individual investors also has increased since 
the 1990s. In FY2007, sub-prime loan problems already arose in the United States, and 
the share of foreign investors began to fall, while the share of individual investors rose. 
Figure 2-1 and 2-2 show the indicators of foreign investors’ attitudes towards 
voting in FY2006 and FY2007. In terms of mean values of all firms contained in the  
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database, more than 30% of votes are affirmative, and about 4% of votes were cast 
against companies’ proposals. On the other hand, about 50% of eligible votes were 
unexercised, perhaps because foreign investors face procedural obstacles in voting their 
shares. 
Table 2-2 shows mean values of limited sample firms, more than 50% of the 
stocks of which are owned by foreign investors. More than 60% of votes are affirmative, 
while only 20%–30% of eligible votes were unexercised. This suggests that foreign 
investors, who own more than 50% of the outstanding stock in each of the firms 
sampled, have stronger attitudes towards voting. 
 
8. Estimation results 
 
Stock ownership 
Table 3 shows the results of estimation models that include only debt ratios 
and variables for stock ownership by investor type. 
First, in models using ordinary profit ratios as dependent variables, share 
ownership by financial and non-financial institutions has a significant negative effect on 
debt ratios until the early 2000s. This may imply that institutional ownership presents a 
moral hazard. As evidence of that possibility, the negative effect weakened since the 
early 2000s, as cross-shareholding dissolved. 
Share ownership by individual investors had a negative effect during the same 
period. This suggests that the monitoring functions of such transient votes were 
insufficient to discipline management and influence corporate governance. 
Share ownership by foreign investors had a positive effect on profit ratios 
until the early 2000s, suggesting that external monitoring worked to discipline the 
management. However, it should be noticed that such a positive effect turned 
insignificant in the late 2000s. 
Second, in models using TFP growth as a dependent variable, the estimated 
results of signs of coefficients and their significance are nearly the same as in models 
using ordinary profit ratios. That is, cross-shareholding between financial and  
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non-financial institutions and stock ownership by individuals had significant negative 
effects on productivity growth. Debt ratios have not had a significant effect since the 
late 1990s, although they showed a positive influence before that time. On the other 
hand, foreign investors’ ownership continued to have a positive effect on productivity 
growth. Most of these results are consistent with previous literature. 
Third, in terms of Tobin’s q, compared with the models with the profit ratios 
and TFP growth, the effect of stock ownership by financial institutions was not stable on 
both average q and marginal q, which depends on the variables and the sample periods. 
Stock ownership by non-financial firms, individuals, and foreign investors had results 
similar to the other models cited above. However, note that foreign investors’ shares 
turned insignificant on marginal q in FY2002–2007. As is also shown in previous 
studies, the effect of debt ratios on Tobin’s q was insignificant in most periods. 
 
Exercises of voting rights 
Table 4 represents the results of estimation models with the ratios of concrete 
votes as well as the share data of stock ownership. Since company-specific information 
about votes cast by Japanese investors is not comprehensively disclosed, only votes by 
U.S. investors are available for analysis. Accordingly, the sample firms are narrowed to 
those with more than 50% of their outstanding shares owned by foreign investors in 
FY2004 to FY2007. Thus, these firms are considered to be largely influenced by foreign 
shareholders’ votes.
2 
First, in models using ordinary profit ratios as dependent variables, the 
qualitative variables representing voting attitudes were positive but not significant in 
regard to profit ratios, and the significance of share variables is almost identical to the 
models described in Table 1. 
Second, the results of models using TFP growth as a dependent variable 
suggest a strong and positive relationship between productivity growth and foreign 
investors’ involvement in shareholder voting and monitoring management. These results 
                                            
2  It should be noted that, due to the limitation of data availability, the degrees of freedom in the model are 
relatively small enough to be significant, and it is necessary to broadly interpret the estimation results.  
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support the hypothesis that investors’ active involvement in corporate governance leads 
to improved corporate performance. 
Third, in terms of the models with Tobin’s q, neither quantitative variables of 
shares of stock ownership nor qualitative variables of votes had significant effects on 
corporate values. 
  Further conclusions emerge regarding foreign ownership and voting on 
shareholder issues: an increase in foreign ownership and vote ratios coincided with 
productivity growth but did not positively affect performance indicators, especially in 
recent years. This result suggests that obstacles weaken the effects of external 
monitoring, that voting procedures for foreign investors in Japanese companies are 
complicated, and that investors have little time to evaluate proposals and decide their 
votes. Therefore, it is important to resolve this problem in order to encourage investors 
to participate in corporate governance. 
 
Concrete proposals voted by foreign investors 
  Additionally, we explore the types of proposals foreign investors voted on, 
using the Proxy Watch database. Table 5 describes specific proposals voted on by 
foreign investors. In FY2007, the ratio of affirmative votes is higher for stock 
repurchases and executive compensation than for other shareholder proposals. Increases 
in ratios of votes supporting those proposals from FY2006 to FY2007 suggest that 
foreign investors particularly supported stock repurchases when companies’ 
performance was stumbling. 
On the other hand, the ratio of dissenting votes is higher for proposals 
involving anti-takeover protection, election of company auditors, and issuance of stock 
options. Anti-takeover protections and issuance of stock options are directly related to 
interests and rights of external investors; their enactment and could conflict with 
investors’ interests. In comparison with FY2006 and FY2007, the ratios of elections of 
external directors, company auditors, and anti-takeover protection largely increased. 
This trend likely suggests that investors attend more closely to elections of directors as 
board members’ prerogatives over stock options and appropriation of retained earnings  
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increase. 
When shareholder proposals conflict with their own financial interests, it is 
possible that dissenting votes reflect shareholders’ self-interest, not their involvement in 
corporate governance and monitoring management. 
 
9. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
 
This study aims to investigate an issue that previous literature has not dealt 
with empirically: how shareholders’ involvement in corporate governance by exercising 
their voting rights leads to improved corporate performance. Using panel data of Japan’s 
listed companies and foreign investors’ votes on shareholder proposals in FY1986 to 
FY2007, this study demonstrates that (1) an increase in foreign investors’ stock 
ownership positively influenced productivity growth, but recently it has not influenced 
other corporate performance indices, (2) foreign investors’ active involvement as voting 
shareholders had a positive effect on productivity growth. Therefore, one conclusion is 
that external stakeholders’ active, qualitative involvement in corporate governance, as 
well as their quantitative involvement with increasing shares, is a key to improving 
corporate growth and is important in monitoring corporate management. 
As described in Section 2, investment trustees, managers, and association 
groups recently have recognized the importance of corporate governance and their 
voting rights, and they have acted to establish appropriate standards. The empirical 
results of this study suggest these actions will improve the infrastructure for 
strengthening corporate governance in Japan. 
However, the results of the estimations also suggest that foreign investors’ 
shares and votes would have had weaker or insignificant influences on corporate 
performance. Thus, it is important for Japanese investors to establish the infrastructure 
for voting rights, to evaluate for themselves proposals submitted by companies, and to 
set their own policies for maximizing investment returns. It is not sufficient simply to 
follow voting attitudes of foreign investors. 
In current discussions of corporate governance in Japan, the independence of  
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external directors and auditors is the topic mainly discussed, as suggested by the recent 
workshop concerning corporate governance organized by Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry. Although the requirements for voting on external board members in 
Japan’s Companies Act are tighter than the U.S., shareholders in Japan have more 
voting authority to dismiss external managers than their U.S. counterparts. Thus, 
decisions at shareholder meetings have a critical impact on organizing board members 
and their ability to operate without considering shareholders’ wishes. 
In addition, better mechanisms should be developed for disclosing 
information about shareholder meetings and decisions, and a comprehensive database 
should be developed to guide the interests and decisions of external stakeholders and 
corporate management. These efforts to strengthen corporate governance should lead 
not only to growth of individual firms but also to economic growth at a time when 
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